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I. INTRODUCTION

I may not be the only surviving founder of the ICSID Convention, but I
believe there are not many of us left. In any event, I was "present at the

creation," to borrow Dean Acheson's phrase, and I think it is of interest - not
only historical interest - to go back to the period 1963-1965 to look at what
was expected, what looked possible, and what has become of the Convention
in the intervening decades.

II. ORIGINS OF THE CONVENTION
A. A Decade at the UnitedNations
The initiative for the Convention came as a counterpoint to the debate that
had gone on for some ten years in various organs of the United Nations over
the relation between host countries - i.e. developing countries - and foreign
investors - i.e. multinational corporations. A compromise Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources' had finally made it through
the General Assembly, containing numerous recitals of sovereignty and selfdetermination and not much welcome to increased foreign investment. A
proposal that compensation for expropriation or nationalization be subject only
to the national law of the host state was defeated, and the final version as
adopted spoke of "rules in force in the State taking such measures.., and in
accordance with international law." 2 The back and forth at the United Nations
(UN) can be seen in the following two sentences of the same paragraph.
First,
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such
measures shall be exhausted.
Second,
However, upon agreement by Sovereign States and other
parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made
through arbitration or international negotiation.3

G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217/Supp. No. 17 (Dec. 14, 1962).
Id.
3 Id. 4. It is interesting that in comparison with the draft proposed by the Special
Commission to the General Assembly, the first sentence was changed from "should" to "shall"i.e. stronger for the host country, while the second sentence was changed from "may" to
2
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Would investor-state arbitration be compatible with this formulation? Many
states thought not: international law concerned agreements between states;
agreements between states and private parties were subject only to national
law. The United States and the United Kingdom sought to counter this view
by introducing an amendment that became a new Paragraph 8, providing that
foreign investment agreements "shall be observed in good faith."4 The
amendment did not state explicitly "agreements between foreign investors and
sovereign States." Apparently that would have been too direct. The best the
capital-exporting countries could do was the formula "by or between sovereign
States."5
This then was the climate of opinion, reflected in a fragile consensus, at the
United Nations.
B. A Different Climate at the World Bank
At the World Bank, meanwhile, where the industrial states had greater voice
and greater vote, a different perception was taking shape. Neither the World
Bank and its regional analogues, nor bilateral assistance programs such as the
American "Alliance for Progress," could satisfy the needs for capital of the
developing countries. Moreover, while the public sector could only provide
funds, private investors could provide the technical skills, management, knowhow, and marketing needed for sustainable economic advancement. But in the
wake of decolonization in Africa and parts of Asia and take-overs of foreign
investments throughout the Third World, potential investors would seek some
protection before risking their capital and personnel in an often hostile
environment. Even if agreement on the substance of the obligations of host
states to foreign investors could not be achieved except in the most general
terms, availability of a stable facility for dispute settlement, presided over by
"should,"
4

-

i.e. stronger for the investors.

Id. 8.

The final version of Paragraph 8 read:
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign
States shall be observed in good faith; States and international organizations
shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and
nations over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter
and the principles set forth in the present resolution.
Id. (emphasis added). For details of the debates and the various drafts considered by the General
Assembly, see Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the UN's Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over NaturalResources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463 (1963), and Karol N. Gess, Permanent
Sovereignty over NaturalResources, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398 (1964), which reproduces the
final text along with two earlier drafts.
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an institution with both prestige and money, might reduce some of the
disincentives to foreign direct investment and thereby contribute to the Bank's
mission of furthering economic development.
C. Laying Out the Plan
Internal memoranda along these lines had been circulating at the World
Bank since the summer of 1961, written or stimulated by the Bank's creative
General Counsel, Aron Broches. 6 By April 1962, the Bank's Executive
Directors devoted a meeting to the proposal for a Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, to be created by a multilateral treaty,7 and a Working
Paper in the form of a draft convention was circulated to governments in the
summer of 1962.'
In February 1963, Broches submitted to a Committee of the Whole9 a
detailed commentary on the proposal.'" Interestingly enough, Broches made
no mention of the debates at the United Nations or of the Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty just adopted. But he spoke of three proposals under
discussion. One was the Draft OECD Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property, which would set out substantive rules for the protection of foreignowned property as well as rights of investors to proceed against host states
before an international tribunal." That proposal got nowhere at the time, nor
when renewed in the 1990s. 2
A second proposal was to establish a multilateral investment insurance
system. That proposal also got nowhere in the 1960s, but was the forerunner
6

1 rely for this pre-history on 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT

DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION

OF THE CONVENTION, pt. 1 (1968) [hereinafter ICSID HISTORY].

' Memorandum of Meeting of Executive Directors on the Subject of "Settlement of
Investment Disputes" (Mar. 13, 1962), in id. at 13-19 (Doc. No. 5).
' Working Paper in the Form of a Draft Convention Prepared by the General Counsel and
Transmitted to the Executive Directors (June 5, 1962), in id. at 19-46 (Doc. No. 6).
9 The Committee of the Whole is comprised of all the Executive Directors organized as an
ad hoc committee without reference to their respective voting power.
10 Paper Prepared by the General Counsel and Transmitted to the Members of the Committee
of the Whole (Feb. 18, 1963), in ICSID HISTORY, supra note 6, at 71-85 (Doc. No. 15).
" See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Draft Convention
on the ProtectionofForeignProperty,2 I.L.M. 241 (1963), availableat http://www.oecd.org/da
taoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf.
12 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD],
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, REPORT TO THE MINISTRY BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: WHY DID IT FAIL? 162-70 (1999).
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of MIGA, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, organized under
auspices of the World Bank in the 1980s."3 "The Bank's approach to the
problem," Broches wrote, "is more modest than the other two."
While they aim at improving the investment climate, the
proposals submitted to [the Bank's] Executive Directors neither
contemplate rules for the treatment of foreign property nor
compulsory adjudication of disputes. They would make available
to foreign investors and host governments facilities for
conciliation or arbitration of disputes between them. Use of these
facilities would be entirely voluntary. No government and no
investor would ever be under an obligation to go to conciliation
or arbitration without having consented thereto. 4
Broches then set out the principal features of the proposal - about the role
of the Bank, the rules for conduct of an arbitration or conciliation, and the
binding effect on both parties of an agreement to submit particular
controversies to arbitration under the convention:
If the parties had agreed to use the services of the Center for
arbitration as the sole means of settling their dispute, the
government party should not be permitted to refer the private
party to the government's national courts, and the private party
should not be permitted to seek the protection of its own
government and that government would not be entitled to give
such protection .... Finally,... the Convention would provide
that such awards would be enforceable in the territories of the
countries adhering to the Convention. 5
Essentially, this became the plan for the Convention, as it went through
several further drafts. What was carefully omitted was any provision going to
the substance of the obligations running between host states and foreign
investors. The Convention, in other words, was to be an arbitration
convention, not a convention concerning the international law of investment.

"3Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 1985,
T.I.A.S. No. 12089, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 (concluded in Seoul, South Korea on Oct. 11, 1985 and
entered into force Apr. 12, 1988).
14 ICSID HISTORY, supra note 6, at 74.
15 Id. at 80.
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The sole provision about what arbitrators might do if a dispute between a state
and a foreign investor came before them read like the arbitration rules of the
6
ICC or the London Court of International Arbitration.'
In the absence of any agreement between the parties
concerning the law to be applied,. . . the Arbitral Tribunal shall
decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules
of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine to
be applicable. 7
Why did the proposed convention not say something about the law, about
the obligations that were to be upheld by dispute settlement under the Bank's
auspices? I believe for the same reason that Broches and George Woods, the
President of the World Bank, carefully avoided a diplomatic conference or
even a world-wide preparatory conference. They did not want this effort to
replicate the experience of the United Nations. Instead, the Bank called for
four regional "Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts," - not, quite clearly,
meetings of politicians. The deliberations were to be informative and
technical - professionals going over a draft prepared in advance. All expenses
(including first class air fare) would be paid by the Bank.
D. The Consultative Meetings (December 1963-May 1964)
At these four meetings - in Addis Ababa, Santiago de Chile, Geneva, and
Bangkok - Broches explained the Bank's limited agenda:
Some might think it desirable to go beyond [creating a dispute
settlement machinery] and attempt to reach a substantive
definition of the status of foreign property .... At the same time
16 See ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 17 (1998 version), availableathttp://www.iccwbo.org/

uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules arb-english.pdf ("In the absence of any ...
agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law which is determines to be
appropriate."); LCIA Rules, art. 22 (1998), availableat http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/ARB
_DOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/rules.pdf ("Unless the parties at any time agree otherwise in
writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power.., to conduct such enquiries as may
appear... to be necessary or expedient, including whether and to what extent the Arbitral
Tribunal should itself take the initiative in .
ascertaining the ... law(s) or rules of law
applicable to the arbitration .... ).
"?Article VI, section 5(1) in the June 5, 1962 draft, essentially unchanged as Article VI,
section 4(1) in the August 9, 1963 draft and as Article IV section 4(1) of the October 15, 1963
draft that became the basis for the four regional meetings described hereafter.
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however, there was need to pursue a parallel effort of more
limited scope, represented by the Bank's proposals."8
The bargain offered to developing countries was a convention that would
accept in principle that states and foreign investors could submit their legal
disputes to international tribunals with binding effect. In return, the investor's
home state would no longer be able to "espouse" a claim of its nationals.
The Convention would offer a means of settling directly, on the
legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign
investor and would insulate such disputes from the realm of
politics and diplomacy. 9
The proponents of the Convention wanted to make sure not to take a bigger
bite than they could chew. The Convention would not lay down standards for
the treatment by States of the property of aliens, and it would not be concerned
with the merits of investment disputes.
While the Bank believed that private investment had a valuable
contribution to make to economic development, it was neither a
blind partisan of the cause of the private investor, nor did it wish
to impose its views on others. 20
The suggestion to spell out the law - and in particular the international
law - to be applied came up only in the Geneva meeting - dominated by
representatives of capital-exporting countries, and was neatly parried by
Broches.2' In the Santiago meeting which I attended, the United States
delegation quickly got the hint. We expressed support for the Convention by
proposing technical drafting changes, particularly with respect to defining a
foreign investor in terms of ownership and control even if it was locally
incorporated.2 2 But we made no speeches about the benefits of foreign
investment, or the dangers of expropriation, the Hull Formula, or similar
elements of United States doctrine.

ICSID HISTORY, supranote 6, at 240-41.
"9Broches gave substantially the same introductory speech at each of the meetings. Id.
'8

at 241-43 (Addis Ababa), 303-05 (Santiago), 369-73 (Geneva), 464-65 (Bangkok).

20Id. at 242.
2 Id. at 418-20.
22Id. at 359-62 (remarks of Mr. Belin and Mr. Lowenfeld).
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Even the modest proposals of the Bank were hard for many of the Latin
Americans to accept. The delegate of Brazil stated that the Convention raised
constitutional problems, since it implied curtailment of the judicial branch's
monopoly of the administration of justice, and would grant foreign investors
a legally privileged position in violation of full equality before the law.23 The
representative of Argentina said that foreign investors in his country had
sufficient guarantees so as to make recourse to other bodies unnecessary: "No
shadow of suspicion must be allowed to fall on these
guarantees, as would be
24
the case were the suggested agreement ratified.
E. Adoption of the Convention-Not by Consensus
In the event, as is well known, the World Bank went ahead with a resolution
of the Board of Governors at the Annual Meeting in Tokyo to approve the
Convention for submission to member governments. The resolution was
passed, but with 21 countries - all the Latin American countries plus the
Philippines - voting against. 25 I believe this was the first time that a major
resolution of the World Bank had been pressed forward with so much
26
opposition - "El No de Tokyo" as the Latin American press called it.
I tell this story to recall for the present generation how it was that the ICSID
Convention came out as it did. On the one hand it reflected a significant
counter-trend to the trend at the United Nations that was moving at the same
time from "Permanent Sovereignty" to the "New International Economic
Order," which would have essentially excluded international law from the
regulation of foreign investment. On the other hand the Convention had two
very large gaps: (1) Companies considering an investment in a country that had
joined the Convention could not count on consent to arbitrate, and (2) even if
a host state gave its consent to arbitrate disputes that might arise out of a given
investment, there was no assurance about the criteria that an ICSID tribunal
might apply if a dispute were submitted to it. No "fair and equitable treatment"
provision, no non-discrimination provision, nothing about expropriation,
compensation, or "full protection and security." Remember, this was the
period when the U.S. Supreme Court wrote:

23 Id. at 306 (remarks of Mr. Ribeiro).
24 Id. at 308 (remarks of Mr. Barboza).
25 Id. at 608 (Resolution No. 214 of the Board of Governors, Sept. 10, 1964).
26 For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the negative attitude toward the Convention

in Latin America, see Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes ConventionandLatinAmerica, 11
VA.J. INT'L L. 256 (1971).
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There are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's

power to expropriate the property of aliens.27
No wonder that only eleven disputes were brought to the Centre in its first
fifteen years, and only six resulted in a final award.
III. THE TRANSFORMATION

In the 1980s and thereafter, the two gaps were filled. One could say the
Convention was amended, but of course the provisions for amendment of the
28
Convention were not followed, and indeed are almost impossible to follow.
Transformation is a better term from the point of view both of legality and
reality.
A. The State's Consent to Arbitrate
None of the discussion at the consultative meetings, or so far as I know in

the contemporary writing and legislative consideration, addressed the
possibility that a host state in a bilateral treaty could give its consent to arbitrate
with investors from the other state without reference to a particular investment
agreement or dispute. I know that I did not mention that possibility in my

27 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
28 Article 66 of the ICSID Convention provides that a proposed amendment shall enter into
force thirty days after all Contracting States have ratified, accepted, or approved it. Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 66,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (emphasis
added). In contrast, the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank itself provide that, except for
three sections concerning withdrawal and liability, amendments enter into force for all members
when approved by three-fifths of the members having four-fifths of the voting power.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement art. 8 (as
amended Feb. 16, 1989). The same formula, also with limited exceptions, is contained in the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), which was in fact amended
in a major way in 1978. The provision on amendment was changed from the earlier drafts which
called for a two-thirds majority except for amendments imposing new obligations or affecting
the provisions on jurisdiction and enforcement, but some states were nervous about being bound
by any provisions their parliament had not approved. See International Monetary Fund Articles
of Agreement art. 28 (as amended Nov. 11, 1992). At the meeting of the Executive Directors
in March 1965, Broches said he would have preferred an amendment procedure that did not give
every state a veto, but he did not insist, evidently because he did not want to risk sending the
convention back to governments that had already approved it. ICSID HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 1000-03.
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testimony before the U.S. Congress,29 and neither did anyone else.30 Nor,
except in a very subtle hint, was the suggestion made in the Report of the
Executive Directors of the Bank submitted to governments with a view to
ratification of the Convention.3' Yet consent by states pursuant to the Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) has become the standard practice.
I am not suggesting that the practice, whereby the State's consent to
arbitration is open-ended and the investor's consent is given typically only
when a dispute arises, is unlawful. Linking the dispute resolution provisions
of BITs to ICSID can be reconciled without difficulty to Article 25 of the
Convention:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting
State... and a national of another Contracting State which the
32
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.

29 See U.S. Implementationof the Convention on Settlement oflnvestment DisputesBetween

States and Nationals of Other States: Hearing on HR. 15785 Before the Subcomm. on
InternationalOrganizations& Movements of the H. Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 89th Cong. 6
(1966) (statement of Andreas Lowenfeld, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dept.).
30 For a fuller record of consideration of the Convention by the U.S. Senate,
including the
submissions of the Executive Branch and numerous private parties and organizations, see
CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES ACT OF 1966, S. REP. No. 89-1374
(2d Sess. 1966).
31 Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Report of the Executive Directors read as follows:
23. Consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre.
Consent to jurisdiction must be in writing and once given cannot be
withdrawn unilaterally (Article 25(1)).
24. Consent of the parties must exist when the Centre is seized (Articles 28(3)
and 36(3)) but the Convention does not otherwise specify the time at which
consent should be given. Consent may be given, for example, in a clause
included in an investment agreement, providing for the submission to the
Centre of future disputes arising out of that agreement, or in a compromise
regarding a dispute which has already arisen. Nor does the Convention
require that the consent of both parties be expressed in a single instrument.
Thus, a host State might in its investment promotion legislation offer to
submit disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the jurisdiction
of the Centre, and the investor might give his consent by accepting the offer
in writing.
REPORT OF THE ExEcurlvE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (Mar. 18, 1965),

reprintedin ISCID CONVENTION: REGULATIONS AND RULES 43 (2006).
32 ICSID Convention, supranote 28, art. 25.
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Nothing in the text says the consent by the State must have been given in
the investment agreement giving rise to the dispute, or even that there must
have been an investment agreement. But the link was unexpected, and I am
fairly certain, unplanned. There is no doubt that the vast number of BITs
containing consent to arbitrate under ICSID has effected a major
transformation of the Convention.
It is interesting that Broches, in his many speeches and writings about the
Convention,33 did not mention the link until 1982 - i.e., never before it was
widely in use. I do not know whether Broches, who spent so much of his
career in drafting and promoting the ICSID Convention, did not think of the
possibility of consent in blank by host states, or believed that if he mentioned
the idea it would contribute to the nervousness of host states. In his only
writing, as far as I know, on BITs, Broches concluded:
Investment protection treaties and the Convention serve the
identical aim of creating mutual confidence and an investment
climate which will promote increased international investment
flows .

.

.

. Introducing the Convention mechanism into

investment protection treaties may therefore be regarded as a
particularly felicitous development.34
B. The Applicable Law
As I mentioned earlier, what became Article 42 of the Convention was
adopted with as little discussion as possible. In the absence of agreement by
the parties, the tribunal was to apply the law of the host State "and such rules
of international law as may be applicable."35 The BITs provide the agreement.
First,there is no more "absence of agreement." The treaty itself is applicable,
thereby overcoming the law in many states (as well as the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States) committing regulation of foreign investment solely
to national law. Second, specific obligations with respect to treatment of
foreign investments are set out: national treatment, most- favored-nation
treatment, fair and equitable treatment "no less than," or "as required by"
international law. Third, some BITs add the so-called "umbrella clause"

33 See ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF
PuBuc AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) [hereinafter SELECTED ESSAYS].
34 ARON BROCHES, BilateralInvestment ProtectionTreaties andArbitrationof Investment

Disputes, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 33, at 457.
" ICSID Convention, supra note 28, art. 42.
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expressly requiring host states to observe any obligation it may have entered
into with regard to foreign investments, that is converting (or purporting to
convert) contracts subject to domestic law into international obligations.
Fourth, the BITs universally set out the conditions for permissible
expropriation, including a requirement of compensation and the criteria for
such compensation. Fifth,the BITs provide a right to foreign investors to resort
to international dispute settlement - nearly always with ICSID as one of the
available fora.
In enumerating these provisions typical in Bilateral Investment Treaties I
am not telling this audience everything it did not know. Nor am I suggesting
that the words in the treaties answer all the questions, or that phrases such as
"fair and equitable treatment" or "as required by international law" or "fair
market value" have clear and uncontestable meanings. My point is that the gap
in the Convention has been filled, and that it has been transformed into a
foreign investment protection convention.
One might say that was always the intention, and that the Convention as
negotiated and adopted in the 1960s was a stepping stone. But Mr. Broches
was careful to say at each of the Consultative Meetings that the Convention
was not concerned with the merits of investment disputes, 36 and in his Hague
Lectures he rejected the characterization of the Convention as an instrument for
the protection of private foreign investment as "one-sided and too narrow. 3 7
But with the link to the BITs, the Convention, and the two-hundred or so
disputes that have come before ICSID Tribunals, ICSID has become a vast and
growing depository of decisions, rulings, and precedents - one may fairly say
a corpus juris of foreign investment law, or if you will, foreign investment
protection law. This brings me to my last point.
IV. BITS AND CUSTOMARY LAW
Given the large web of BITs covering every continent and countries in all
stages of development- 2,781 according to my latest information - can one say
that the BITs as construed and interpreted by international tribunals are now
evidence of customary international law, so that it is dispositive even when a
given controversy is not explicitly governed by a treaty?

36

ICSID HISTORY, supranote 6, at 242 (Addis Ababa), 304 (Santiago), 372 (Geneva), 465

(Bangkok).
37 ARONBROCHES, The Conventionon the Settlement oflnvestment DisputesBetween States
and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 33, at 197.
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F.A. Mann, writing early in the Age of BITs, answered "yes." 38 Others,
particularly those who question how voluntary the rush to sign BITs really was,
answer "no." Their contention is that each BIT is a lex specialis, applicable
only between the host country and a national of the other State Party to the
treaty, so that precedents arising out of disputes under other treaties are of no
consequence, even if their content is identical or nearly so°39 The argument,
recently embraced by the United States government in the context both of
investment treaties and of humanitarian law, is that to create or evidence
customary law, states need not only follow a certain practice in large
numbers,
4
but need to do so from a sense of legal obligation - opiniojuris.0
I find that argument unconvincing. It relies on a definition of customary
international law - itself creature of customary law - that is inextricably
circular: practice, no matter how widespread, cannot ripen into customary law
unless it is taken from a belief that it is required by law, and it cannot be
regarded as law if it has not ripened (some use "crystallized") as law. Some
authorities suggest that a widely accepted multilateral treaty may lead to the
creation of customary international law. a' My submission, consistent with the
position of Dr. Mann, is that the ICSID Convention, the very wide acceptance
of substantially identical BITs, and the substantial body of precedents, taken
together, do represent a contribution to customary international law, a body of
law that cannot and should not stand still.

" F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestment, 1981 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 241. Dr. Mann wrote:
The paramount duty of States imposed by international law is to observe and
act in accordance with the requirements of good faith. From this point of view
it follows that, where these treaties express a duty which customary
international law imposes or is widely believed to impose, they give very
strong support to the existence of such a duty and preclude the Contracting
States from denying its existence.
Id. at 249-50.
" See, e.g., Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994).
40 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 686-87 (1998); see also
Introductory Note of U.S. Joint Letterfrom John BellingerI1, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department
ofState, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, US. Department of Defense, to Dr. Jakob
Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary
International Law Study by Dennis Mandsager, 46 I.L.M. 511 (2007). For the recent U.S.
government position, see Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Annex A (2004).
41 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHEFOREIGNRELATIONSLAwOF THE UNITED
STATES
§ 102(3) (1987).
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In a dispute arising under a BIT, I am clear that the ICSID Tribunal can and
generally should take account of - not necessarily follow but consider decisions and awards rendered by other tribunals, whether under ICSID,
UNCITRAL, or other comparable tribunals hearing claims under other BITs.
The harder question arises when no BIT is directly applicable. My answer is
the same. Thus, if I may borrow from my own treatise on International
Economic Law:
Suppose Patria has entered into [substantially identical] BITs with
Xandia, Tertia, and Quarta, but not with Quinta. However, Patria
has joined the ICSID Convention, and has consented to ICSID
arbitration of disputes that may arise in connection with an
investment agreement with Supranational Corporation
(SUNATCO), a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of Quinta. A dispute arises and is submitted to an ICSID
Tribunal. In [my submission,] the arbitrators should take into
account all the obligations undertaken by Patria in its BITs with
Xandia et al., as evidence of Patria's understanding of
international law for the purpose of applying Article 42 of the
ICSID Convention. Patria should be given the opportunity to
explain why it had not concluded a treaty with Quinta, but unless
the explanation is compelling that a different standard of
treatment of investors from Quinta was contemplated and
communicated to the government of Quinta and to SUNATCO, the
failure to conclude an agreement with Quinta applicable to the
dispute should not [preclude the Tribunal from applying
contemporary customary law as reflected in the web ofbilaterals].
In contrast, if Patria has consistently declined to conclude a BIT
with any country, the argument in favor of applying the principle
set out in2 the BITs, while not excluded, would be significantly
4

weaker.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, it is hard to tell to what extent ICSID plus BITs have led to
increased private investment of the kind that contributes to economic
development, though in individual instances, such as Argentina's rush to
42
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privatization in the 1990s under President Menem, the combination of ICSID
and BITs clearly served as a stimulus to foreign investors. But the combination
has clearly transformed the Convention, filled in the gaps necessary to make
ICSID an important institution, and as I see it, contributed to the progress of
customary international law.

